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Abstract: Buffer zones as a concept have a long history. Despite their frequent occurrence in
international relations past and present, however, they have been treated in passing by scholars and
policymakers alike, and then usually from a purely historical perspective. Their importance in conflict
management, third-party intervention and power politics are not adequately mirrored in scholarly
research. This article seeks to remedy this lapse by re-introducing the buffer zone as a tool of
international conflict management in a new and systematic fashion. In this article, we survey buffer
zones, their conceptual roots and characteristics, and illustrate our theoretical findings with an array
of different examples—predominantly from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In so doing, we
make three fundamental arguments about buffer zones.
f, as realists suggest, states are like a cluster of “billiard balls,” colliding against
one another with little room to maneuver and few shock absorbers, then in
theory, a buffer zone serves to provide countries with more cushioning,
ostensibly mitigating potential security dilemmas that might arise.1 From this angle,
buffer zones may make sense for countries like Turkey or Jordan that are trying to
contain the Syrian civil war violence from spreading across borders. Indeed, there
are at least a dozen such formalized zones across the globe, from Cyprus to the Sinai
to Moldova’s Transnistria region,2 with repeated calls for installing similar zones in
other ongoing conflict zones. Past negotiations between Russia and Ukraine featured
calls for a 30-kilometer buffer zone along Ukraine’s eastern border from which both
sides had agreed to withdraw heavy armaments; the agreement was promptly
violated.3
1 This analogy was first articulated by Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New
York: Waveland Press, 2010). Airspace legal scholars have justified the need for 45 miles as a
legitimate aerial buffer zone to allow aircraft the right of “innocent passage,” see Gbenga
Oduntan, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in the Airspace and Outer Space: Legal Criteria for Spatial
Delimitation (New York/London: Routledge, 2011).
2 Alan Taylor, “Frozen in Time: The Cyprus Buffer Zone,” The Atlantic, Oct. 4, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2014/4/frozen-in-time-the-cyprus-buffer-
zone/100714/.
3 Alexander Kolyandr, “Ukraine Signs Deal with Rebels to Create Buffer Zone,” Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 20, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-signs-deal-with-rebels-to-create-
buffer-zone-1411207014.
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This article makes an argument about buffer zones in three parts. First, we
contend that buffer zones exhibit characteristics previously overlooked; most
particularly, a strategic flexibility that allows their use as both a passive tool of
conflict management, as well as an active, offensive tool of intervention. Second, as a
tool of crisis management, buffer zones are poorly defined, which gives them legal
ambiguity.  Again, this allows states to buffer themselves from the negative
externalities of conflict within neighboring states, yet also provides greater wiggle-
room legally to carry out cross-border strikes against non-state actors in such zones.
Third, buffer zones are an attractive tool of foreign policy precisely because of this
strategic and legal flexibility.  Indeed, this dual-use character as both a defensive
mechanism to buffer against conflict, as well as an offensive instrument to stage
cross-border operations, makes buffer zones attractive when policymakers appeal to
domestic constituencies, or react to domestic pressures.  Buffer zones appear as a
low-cost alternative to direct military interventions for casualty-averse publics.
Finally, we examine the use of a buffer zone in greater detail in a short case
study on Turkey’s suggested buffer zone in the Syrian civil war, with a particular
focus on Turkey’s motivation to employ the zone offensively and opportunistically
rather than in a more “conventional” defensive manner.
The Logic of Buffer Zones
The conceptualization of buffer zones derives primarily from the natural
sciences, as a way for conservationists to preserve biodiversity and/or prevent the
spread of infections.  Such “green zones” are aimed at protecting endangered habitats
and wildlife from civilization,4 or vice versa.5 In this way, there is overlap between
the political and the biological or medical sense of the phrase.  Both refer loosely to a
protected zone aimed at preventing some public bad or “tragedy of the commons,”
whether by war or by environmental plunder.
A buffer zone appears to indicate that the state, or some other institution, is
failing to provide some public good.  This could be peacetime order and border
protection, or biodiversity conservation. Consequently, some kind of cordon sanitaire
(historically referring to an area zoned off to prevent infections from spreading) is
required to restore equilibrium. Yet, there are invariably collective action problems
over enforcement and sovereignty, not to mention the threat posed by non-state
actors—from poachers and loggers to rebels or terrorists.6 The U.S. military defines
4 On “green zones,” see Warren R. DeBoer, “Buffer Zones in the Cultural Ecology of
Aboriginal Amazonia: An Ethnohistorical Approach,” American Antiquity , April 1, 1981, pp.
364–77.
5 As an example, see. M. J. Jeger and J. M. Thresh, “Modelling Reinfection of Replanted
Cocoa by Swollen Shoot Virus in Pandemically Diseased Areas,” Journal of Applied Ecology, Jan.
1, 1993, pp. 187–96.
6As an example, see Bhim Prasad Adhikari et al., “Economic Incentives and Poaching of the
One-Horned Indian Rhinoceros in Nepal Stakeholder Perspectives in Biodiversity
Conservation: Analysis of Local, National and Global Stakes in Rhino Conservation in Royal
Chitwan National Park, Nepal,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.papers.ssrn.com/abstract=860244.
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a buffer zone as “a defined area controlled by a peace operations force […] formed
to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the
risk of renewed conflict.”7 UN officials sometimes refer to such zones as an “area of
separation.”8
A buffer zone, by this definition, can take many forms. It can be installed
unilaterally or multilaterally, as well as by a UN Security Council resolution.  It might
be patrolled by a single state or a coalition, by two states together (even prior to
potential adversaries), or by UN peacekeepers.  It could also be demilitarized, so as to
keep the area neutral and prevent hostilities.  Moreover, a buffer zone can be
enforced through other related tools, such as no-fly zones or naval blockades, often
making the exact operational distinction between the various terms difficult.
The major means of implementation (i.e., sea, land or air) may serve as a
differentiator.  However, modern integrated military operations almost invariably
make the interconnection of different loci likely.  For example, buffer zones usually
have air-based surveillance elements, and no-fly zones rely on ground-based laser
targeting. Similarly, they cannot easily be distinguished by their range of targets.
Buffer zones, just as no-fly zones and naval blockades, target all kinds of adversary
units based on rules of engagement,9 even though by trend the latter two concentrate
their efforts on specific components (air and sea respectively).10
Contrasting the buffer zone with another potential remedy for conflict or
cross-border aggression, namely a wall (i.e., a highly fortified construction to wall off
two contiguous states), serves to illuminate further a buffer zone’s characteristics.
Modern walls along state borders are not an above ground moat aimed to repel
invading foreign armies,11 but instead are usually meant to deter violent non-state
actors—rebels, terrorists, illegal immigrants, drug smugglers. Also, a wall is fixed in
one location, and cannot usually be used proactively.
A buffer zone, by contrast, has flexible-use capacity: it can guard passively
and defensively against threats of both other states and (transnational) non-state
actors. However, it can also be used proactively, even opportunistically, when states
create a buffer zone to use force against non-state actors.  In addition, while there are
legal disputes surrounding a wall’s location or function, they usually have a clear legal
framework, namely the law of their respective location.  Buffer zones function in a
legal grey area whereby jus ad bellum or jus in bello norms are temporarily suspended.
7United States/Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms and Acronyms
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011).
8 Alan James, “The United Nations on Golan: Peacekeeping Paradox?” International Relations 9,
no. 1 (1987), pp. 64–84.
9 Timothy McIlmail, “No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion
Regimes over Bosnia and Iraq,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review,
Nov. 1, 1994, p. 35.
10 Alexander Benard, “Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-Fly
Zones,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004), pp. 454–78.
11 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (Boston: MIT Press, 2010).
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Actually, their flexibility both in military-strategic and legal terms are precisely why
they are attractive to many states.
Buffer Zones’ Functions
Buffer zones can have many functions. First, following the “billiard ball”
model, they may guard against two states engaging in hostilities or going to war
against each other.  Surely, this is the most common association with the term buffer
zone. In this case, the states may agree to neutralize the cordon sanitaire and not base
any military hardware there to prevent hostilities. Such a buffer zone might be
monitored by outside parties, such as a UN peacekeeping or observer mission.12 The
buffer zone separating the two Koreas provides a paradigmatic example.
Secondly, buffer zones may serve to contain a civil conflict within one state
from spilling into another.  In this case, the zone could be a jointly patrolled security
cordon between two neighboring powers to prevent the spillover of violence,
fighters, and other destabilizing elements.  Notably, such a buffer zone could also be
installed in a third country (e.g., to buttress neighboring states against the spillover
effects of a conflict).
In both cases—the traditional buffer zone and the spillover buffer zone—
the tool is primarily defensive in nature and likely based on a bilateral or multilateral
agreement.  It would arise out of mutual self-interest and serve a common public
good, namely making (renewed) conflict less likely or avoided altogether.  Ideally,
then, buffer zones can act as confidence-building measures, serve as examples of
cooperation between states, and mitigate against threats posed by the other state, or
non-state actors. Such zones have been established all across the world, including:
between the U.S. and Mexico in the late nineteenth century; between Thailand and
Malaysia: and between Turkey and Iraq in the early 1980s.
The third possible function of buffer zones is more offensive.  Since states
are legally forbidden from militarily entering another state’s territory in the absence
of an armed attack, a buffer zone might allow governments to pursue rebels or
terrorists without technically violating their neighbor’s sovereignty.  In theory, such
an agreement could be mutual, and the states involved would have similar rights of
pursuit.  However, in practice, this variant is most often one-sided. The outside state
patrols a contested area (e.g., a border region) where the other state failed to ascertain
its monopoly on violence, in quasi-preemptive self-defense.
This is a weak legal argument, to be sure, though the U.S. government
applied similar logic to pursue Viet Cong forces into North Vietnam in the late
1960s.13 The United States established a five-kilometer buffer zone along the 17th
parallel to divide North and South Vietnam, yet continually violated this zone to
funnel arms and other war materials to its South Vietnamese allies. The May 19,
12 This model constituted the basis for what traditionally was considered UN peacekeeping:
the interposition of observers between formerly or potentially warring parties in the context
of a neutral area or buffer zone.
13 Nicholas M. Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (Leiden/Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002).
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1967 incursion into North Vietnam was communicated as “designed as purely
defensive intrusion and not an invasion of North Vietnam.”14 Similarly, apartheid-
era South Africa’s buffer zone in Namibia, then a de-facto South African colony, was
instituted as both a shield against the war in Angola spilling over, as well as a way to
pursue separatist rebels and intervene in the Angola civil war.15 In contrast to the
first two functions, this type of buffer zone is not necessarily based on mutual
consent.  Thus, in this regard, it could be considered a military intervention and even
an act of aggression. Buffer zones are then a means of escalation rather than
stability.
The three functions mentioned, thus far, are all primarily strategic in nature.
However, calls for a buffer zone may be (at least on the surface) motivated by
humanitarian concerns.  Humanitarian buffer zones are usually called “safe zones,”
“safe areas” or “safe havens,” where differences in terms denote a difference in
geographic extent, togetherness and placement in the conflict area.16 The purpose of
such a zone would be to shield civilians and refugees from violence perpetrated by
the conflict parties, which is why it is usually implemented by a third-party coalition.
The relatively successful multinational safe haven in 1991 northern Iraq, the
less successful UN-authorized and French-run safe area installed in Rwanda in 1994,
or the disastrous safe areas in the Bosnian civil war are illustrative.17 Clearly, as most
historical examples would suggest, strategic functions and humanitarian motivation
of buffer zones are not mutually exclusive.  Instead, they most often complement
each other. For example, Operation Provide Comfort, which established a
humanitarian buffer zone with an extensive safe haven as well as a no-fly zone in
northern Iraq in 1991, ostensibly was motivated by the need to ease the refugee crisis
along the Turkish border.  Yet, Ankara also was interested in weakening the ability of
Kurdish pro-independence rebels to carry out cross-border attacks from northern
Iraq.18 In this way, for Turkey the buffer zone was one of both humanitarian
necessity and strategic opportunity.
14 Russell Freeburg, “U.S. Defends DMZ Invasion as Legal,” Chicago Tribune, May 20, 1967,
A1, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1967/05/20/page/4/article/u-s-defends-dmz-
invasion-as-legal.
15 Jay Ross, “S. Africa Said To Be Seeking A Buffer Zone for Namibia,” The Washington Post,
Sept. 5, 1981, http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/09/05/s-africa-said-
to-be-seeking-a-buffer-zone-for-namibia/4f7e06e7-df73-40a3-a36e-d7e3e171183e/.
16 Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth
M. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1996), pp. 427–447.
17 Jennifer Hyndman, “Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive? Safe Spaces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Somalia, and Sri Lanka,” Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no. 2 (2003), pp. 167–185, Sarah Graham-
Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 105.
18 George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, “Telephone conference notes from April 15, 1991
with Turgut Ozal, Turkey”, http://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-04-
15--Ozal.pdf; “Telephone conference notes from April 16, 1991, with Turgut Ozal, Turkey”,
http://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-04-16--Ozal%20[1].pdf
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Using Buffer Zones Defensively and Offensively
Similar to other tools of foreign policy and military strategy, buffer zones
possess a strategic ambiguity in terms of their offense-defense objectives.19 Under
what conditions can we expect buffer zones to be defensive ones of necessity or
humanitarianism versus offensive ones of strategic opportunism?  We can offer only
preliminary answers here. Future empirical research should shed further light on this
question. Also, a definitional caveat is in order, as true motivations for buffer zones
or buffer zone proposals are difficult to ascertain. “Selling” a buffer zone to the UN
Security Council also requires states to play up normative, humanitarian, as well as
defensive concerns.  Even the U.S.-installed buffer zone dividing North and South
Vietnam was billed as a “defensive” measure, although it served primarily offensive
purposes.
Several preliminary indicators exist for whether a buffer zone will likely be
one of opportunism or one of necessity. Firstly, the greater the disparity in relative
power between the neighboring states, the more likely there will be a kind of non-
defensive buffer zone.  Clearly there is less need for a defensive buffer zone if one
state can overpower the other or defend itself with proper conventional forces.
Presumably, a more powerful state should have more stable borders and, thus, less
need to erect barriers, even if a civil war erupts on its borders.  Conversely, a failing
state will not need to erect a barrier because the risk of instability is lower. A corollary
is found in Nicholas Taleb and Gregory Treverton’s thesis that argues that some
volatility is good for stability. This explains why Lebanon has been quiet relatively,
despite the war along its border, its close contacts with the Syrian regime, and the
flood of refugees within its borders.20 Moreover, there is less international appetite
to erect a buffer zone to defend a state already in chaos.  Buffer zones tend to make
sense to prevent a strategically important state—Turkey, Cyprus and Israel—from
becoming destabilized by cross-border conflict.
Secondly, states that view their neighbors more as “strategic depth” than as
sovereign entities are more likely to use offensive buffer zones against them, or in
their territory. States that view their neighbors as their own hinterland tend to prefer
buffer zones as a space for their own armies to either retreat into, should a
conventional war break out, or as a way to pursue their non-state enemies across
borders.  Russia has voiced a similar sentiment with respect to Ukraine as historically
part of its “near abroad.”21 Perhaps most famously, Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan
19On offense-defense balance, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,”
World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167–214; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the
International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977); Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive:
Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984);
Stephen VanEvera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,”
International Security 9, no. 1 (1984), pp. 58–107.
20 Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Gregory F. Treverton, “The Calm before the Storm,” Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/calm-storm.
21David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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less as a sovereign country than as a bulwark against India, or a place for its forces to
retreat into should war with India break out.22
Yet, herein lies a paradox.  The conditions needed to maintain a buffer zone
can be the very ones that fuel conflict.  The Pakistani government—especially its
intelligence services—engaged in a multitude of shady relationships with militia
groups, like the Haqqani network, to undermine Kabul’s authority.  This was a way to
prevent Afghanistan from becoming too autonomous and, thus, no longer Pakistan’s
source of strategic depth.  Hence, the idea is not to keep such a buffer state politically
neutral, as one might expect, but rather to keep it weak and dependent. Again similar
dynamics are playing out between Russia and Ukraine.
Thirdly, the presence of past agreements and treaties with similar content, or
with reference to strategic depth, suggest that a buffer zone will be intended for
offensive purposes. The logic here is that these agreements can create norms,
conditions and delineated frontier areas that become de facto buffer zones long after
the agreement has expired.  These circumstances can then give rise to cross-border
violations and an “elasticity” of sovereignty.  Even if the agreements are no longer
valid, states often take the approach that their uses of force have become a normal or
routinized part of their bilateral relationship, thus creating de facto buffer zones on
the ground.  Often these states are either former enemies that sign an agreement to
boost cross-border ties or former allies that see their agreement come undone.
Buffer Zone Effectiveness
Like any foreign policy tool—ranging from sanctions to full-blown military
intervention—assessing effectiveness depends primarily on the costs and benefits
assessed, as well as on the comparative benchmarks employed.23 A full discussion of
how best to assess effectiveness of such a flexible tool is beyond the scope of this
article.  However, judging from historical examples and secondary literature, buffer
zones have a mixed success rate at best, both from a strategic as well as a
humanitarian perspective.  Buffer zones near the Golan Heights have shielded
effectively the violence in Syria from spilling into Israel.24 When Israel withdrew its
forces from Lebanon in 1985, it retained a six-mile security corridor along its
northern periphery to prevent attacks from Hezbollah, which it did reasonably well
22 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2008); Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar
Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate,” USIP Special Report (Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Oct. 2006),
http://www.usip.org/publications/resolving-the-pakistan-afghanistan-stalemate.
23 David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” International Security 24,
no. 3 (1999), pp. 80–107.
24 Although there have been exceptions, see Jonathan Spyers, “Behind the Lines: Hezbollah,
Iran, Syria Join Forces near Golan ‘buffer zone’ Arab-Israeli Conflict,” The Jerusalem Post, Feb.
14, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Behind-the-Lines-Hezbollah-Tehran-
Assad-join-forces-against-buffer-zone-near-the-Golan-Heights-390903.
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for decades.25 The buffer zone between the Koreas has held for more than half a
century.
Others, however, have not only failed to achieve their aims (think of the
demilitarized Rhineland after WWI, or Egypt’s notoriously porous buffer zone to
Gaza), but arguably made the situation worse.26 The physical creation of a buffer
zone can require drastic actions to implement. To install such a zone along the
Angolan-Namibian border, South African forces killed livestock, poisoned wells, and
blocked the distribution of food.27 Likewise, over the past year, Egyptian authorities
have razed thousands of homes to enlarge their buffer zone along the Gazan border
in Sinai.28
The effectiveness of buffer zones can be hampered when there is a false
sense of security during a war in which zones of control are actually often fluid.
This, among other factors, led to disaster in Bosnia.  Can buffer zones possibly be
effective? Certainly. But they are rarely without unforeseen complications or costs
for all parties involved.  Are there differences in likely success between defensive
buffer zones driven by necessity and opportunistic and offensive ones?  While there
might be preliminary evidence pointing in this direction, further research is clearly
required to provide a definitive answer.
Buffer Zones as Tools of Opportunity: A Case Study on Turkey
In the ongoing conflict in Syria, Turkey invoked NATO’s Article IV29 and
proposed, on multiple occasions, different types of military intervention for
“humanitarian” reasons, including a buffer zone. A buffer zone appeared attractive to
its proponents in Ankara because of its strategic and legal flexibility. Our
investigation reveals its likely use in an active-offensive manner: its implementation
would certainly mean extensive strikes against Kurdish separatists, and, because of
the inherent characteristics of a buffer zone, full-blown Turkish intervention into the
Syrian civil war.
Turkey’s Buffer Zone Proposal
Turkey’s calls for a buffer zone in Syria had a tortuous history. Prior to the
March 2011 outbreak of war, relations between Ankara and Damascus had been on
25 The eventual pullout of forces from southern Lebanon was part of a “land for peace” deal
heavily criticized by Israeli hawks; see “Ending Will Be Harder,” The Economist, July 2006,
http://www.economist.com/node/7198967.
26 Jack Khoury, “Egypt to Raze 2,000 More Homes for Gaza Buffer Zone,” Haaretz, Jan. 12,
2015, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.636538.
27 Ross, “S. Africa Said To Be Seeking A Buffer Zone for Namibia.”
28 Kareem Fahim and Merna Thomas, “Egypt Flattens Neighborhoods to Create a Buffer
with Gaza,” The New York Times, Oct. 29, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/world/middleeast/egypt-sinai-peninsula-gaza-buffer-
zone.html.
29 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
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the mend.  The beginning of this thaw dates back to October 20, 1998, when Syria
and Turkey signed the “Adana Agreement,” a secret treaty to end longstanding
conflicts between the two neighbors following Damascus’s handover of Kurdish
separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan. The agreement subsequently was likened to a
“Turkish—Syrian Camp David Accord.”30 The rapprochement was motivated, in
part, by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s view, which
envisioned Turkey’s role in the region as having “zero problems” along its perimeter,
as well as by Ankara’s need for “strategic depth.” (This term was also the title of
former AKP foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s book).31 Syria was to give up the
province of Hatay and agree to allow the Turkish military to engage in “hot pursuit”
missions against Kurdish separatist rebels up to five kilometers inside Syria without
seeking prior permission from the Syrian authorities.32 Turkish authorities made first
calls for a buffer zone in northern Syria in reference to this secret agreement.33
In September 2011, Turkey broke off all ties with Bashir al Assad.34 In the
early days of the war, Turkey responded in a restrained fashion, with limited tit-for-
tat artillery strikes against Syrian targets across the border.  Ankara grounded a
Russian commercial plane bound for Damascus on suspicions of spiriting radar
equipment to the Assad regime, even as its parliament green-lighted a motion for
military intervention.35
But throughout 2012, Turkey began to pressure the Assad regime through
more indirect means—by hosting opposition groups like the Syrian National Council,
and rebel groups like the Free Syrian Army.  It also allowed the free flow of arms and
other aid across its porous 500-mile border, including foreign jihadists with extremist
agendas such as the salafist Ahrar Al-Sham and Jabhat Al-Nusra.36 This practice has
continued to this day and, unfortunately, has aided in the rise of ISIL.
A series of lethal incidents ratcheted up cross-border tensions further. In
June 2012, a Turkish F-4 fighter jet was shot down near Om al-Tuyour by Syrian
forces, killing both pilots. The pilots were flying in “international airspace” according
30Omar Lamrani, “The Global Intelligence Files—Re: Discussion Turkey/Syria—the Military
Buffer Zone,” Nov. 15, 2011, https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/?viewemailid=189699.
31 For more on Davutoglu’s concept of “strategic depth,” see Aaron Stein, “The Origins of
Turkey’s Buffer Zone in Syria,” War on the Rocks, Dec. 11, 2014,
http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/the-origins-of-turkeys-buffer-zone-in-syria/.
32According to leaked Stratfor memos from Wikileaks, this zone was revised later by Hafiz
Assad to a zone of 15 kilometers; see Lamrani, “The Global Intelligence Files—Re:
Discussion Turkey/Syria—the Military Buffer Zone.”
33 Lamrani, “The Global Intelligence Files."
33 Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Evolving Syria Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Feb. 9, 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-02-09/turkeys-evolving-syria-strategy.
35 Ellen Barry and Rick Gladstone, “Russia Says Syrian Plane Impounded by Turkey Had
Radar Gear, Not Arms,” The New York Times, Oct. 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/middleeast/syria.html.
36 Erin Banco, “Why Turkey Is Essential for the Syrian Opposition,” The Atlantic, May 30,
2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/why-turkey-is-essential-
for-the-syrian-opposition/276389/.
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to Turkey’s foreign minister.37 Turkey’s President Reycep Erdogan vowed to retaliate
with military force, calling Syria a “clear and present threat.”38 Assad later publicly
expressed “regret” for the incident, but did not apologize, nor relent in his use of
cross-border force.39 In January 2013, Syrian forces fired into Turkey and Assad’s El
Muhaberat agents even tried to enter Turkey before being turned back.40
Turkey repeatedly urged its partners to support a security zone and/or a no-
fly zone similar to the 2011 Libyan one.  However, its allies, including the United
States, hesitated to endorse the strategy in the face of severe opposition, especially
from Russia.  Bombings and border raids by the Syrian air force continued for the
rest of 2013.41 More recent cross-border violence has become conflated with the
ongoing Turkish counterinsurgency against Kurdish militants.  The 2014 siege of the
strategically important Kurdish-held border town of Kobani by ISIL forces curiously
did not draw in Turkish forces, though U.S. fighter jets attacked ISIL targets.42
Despite such clashes, there was little public support in Turkey for a military
intervention in Syria, exposing a rift between the populace and Turkey’s business
community on the one hand, and its political leadership on the other.43 Turks have
been overwhelmingly against the use of ground forces in Syria,44 and the government
has slowly backed away from earlier hints of deploying troops across the border.45 In
mid-2015, spurred on by a wave of terrorist attacks by ISIL, as well as several
incidents involving Kurdish separatists, Turkey began selected counterterrorism
airstrikes against ISIL targets in Syria.46 It also reversed a position barring other
NATO forces access to its airbase for carrying out cross-border sorties, and finally
37 Turkey later revised this and admitted the F-4s had briefly entered Syrian airspace; see
Jonathan Marcus, “Syria-Turkey Tension: Assad ‘Regrets’ F-4 Jet’s Downing,” News Portal,
BBC News, July 3, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18685250.
38 Marcus, “Syria-Turkey Tension.”
39 Marcus, “Syria-Turkey Tension.”
40 “Lack of Control along Syrian Border Creates Serious Security Gap,” Today’s Zaman,
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_lack-of-control-along-syrian-border-creates-serious-
security-gap_325684.html.
41 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Reinforces Syria Border as Erdogan Backs U.S. Attack,”
Bloomberg, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-05/turkey-
reinforces-syria-border-as-erdogan-backs-u-s-attack.
42 Tim Arango, “In Liberated Kobani, Kurds Take Pride despite the Devastation,” News
Portal, New York Times, Feb. 1, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/middleeast/in-liberated-kobani-pride-despite-
the-devastation.html.
43 From background interviews with Turkish and Kurdish businessmen in Gaziantep and
Istanbul, Oct. 2013.
44 Doruk Ergun, “Turkish Views on the Syrian Civil War,” Mideast Flashpoints, Jan. 21, 2014,
https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/turkish-views-syrian-civil-war.
45 Later in 2015 he switched his position and said Turkey would be willing to use airpower.
46 “Turkish PM: No Plans to Send Ground Troops into Syria,” BBC News, July 27, 2015,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33671436.
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committed forces to the common international effort against ISIL.47 Concomitantly,
a formal “safe zone” (buffer zone) was finally announced for northern Syria.48
Parallel to these developments, however, Turkey also began attacking Kurdish targets
in southern Turkey, Syria, and northern Iraq, even though Kurdish forces have been
allied to Turkey’s international and NATO partners in their fight against ISIL.49
Ankara’s Agenda for a Buffer Zone
Since at least 2011, Ankara repeatedly has accused the Assad regime of
providing shelter and indirect material support to the largest Kurdish opposition
group in Syria, the People’s Protection Unit (YPG),50 in hopes that the group will
take its fight across the border into Turkey.  Supposedly, Damascus’ “enemy of my
enemy” logic sought to punish Turkey for assisting Syrian opposition groups and
driving a wedge between its Kurdish communities and other rebel forces.  In
response, Turkey sought to extend its routine raids against Kurdistan Worker’s Party
(PKK) strongholds in northern Iraq into greater Syria.  These violations of
sovereignty raise thorny issues for legal scholars, but not among Turkish leaders.
Erdoğan warned Syria that his government would “not stand idle” in the face of
cross-border incursions, and “is capable of exercising its right to pursue Kurdish
rebels inside Syria, if necessary.”51
That script echoes what a retired Turkish general told the BBC back in 2007,
regarding incursions into northern Iraq: “I believe operations will continue on this
scale—pin-point operations, hot-pursuit raids and carefully controlled air strikes.”52
Turkey has long maintained its prerogative to use force against rebel groups across
borders, but until recently limited its reach to Kurdish separatists, as these groups
have traditionally been viewed by the Turkish electorate as the primary security
threat.53
47 Gul Tuysuz and Zeynep Bilginsoy, “Turkey Joins Coalition Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria,”
CNN, Aug. 29, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-
airstrikes/index.html.
48 Martin Matishak, “Is Turkey More Interested in Fighting Kurds Than ISIS?” The Fiscal
Times, Aug. 27, 2015, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/08/27/Turkey-More-Interested-
Fighting-Kurds-ISIS.
49 Matishak, “Is Turkey More Interested in Fighting Kurds Than ISIS?”
50 The YPG is loosely an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is based in
northern Iraq and which has waged a decades-long civil war against Ankara for greater
autonomy.
51Patrick Seale, “Al Assad Uses Kurds to Fan Regional Tensions,”  Gulfnews, Aug. 2, 2012,
http://m.gulfnews.com/opinion/al-assad-uses-kurds-to-fan-regional-tensions-1.1056945.
52 Mark Mardell, “Talk of Invasion,” BBC Euroblog, July 19, 2007,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markmardell/2007/07/talk_of_invasion_1.html.
53 Rebecca Collard, “Why Turkey Sees the Kurdish People as a Bigger Threat than ISIS,”
Time, July 28, 2015, http://time.com/3974399/turkey-kurds-isis/.
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The Turkish officials we interviewed early on in the war believed, perhaps
naively, that the Obama Administration, as well as NATO, would intervene militarily
in Syria after the November 2012 elections.54 When that proved incorrect, and as the
refugee crisis worsened, Ankara slowly revised its expectations. Ironically, by the
time of the northern Syrian Kurdish militants’ success in the Syrian civil war and their
increasing independence and authority in these regions made them an important
security concern for broader parts of the Turkish leadership, these groups had also
gained new momentum and won international sympathy because of their fight
against ISIL.
Turkey’s government increasingly wanted to quash the danger of a Kurdish
proto-state close to its borders. Yet, it now had to be careful not to antagonize the
only on-the-ground ally the Western coalition had in its fight against ISIL.  In
addition, openly fighting the northern Syrian (and Iraqi) Kurdish groups could void
any hopes for continued peace talks with the Turkish Kurds, which Ankara remained
hesitant to do.  Turkey was in the awkward position of being called upon by the
international community to both directly and indirectly (through fighting ISIL) aid
precisely those rebels whose ranks include untold numbers of Syrian Kurds that
could take up arms against Ankara or proclaim independence in northern Syria were
the Assad regime to fall. Not least, this dilemma may explain part of Turkey’s
passivity regarding the Syrian civil war.
Instead, a tool would have to be found to provide wiggle room for strategic
offense, best under a cloak of legal ambiguity and humanitarian rhetoric. A buffer
zone may be perceived as allowing Turkey to regain some initiative. Consequentially,
Turkey began pushing more forcefully for what it called a “safe zone,” without
providing details of what such a zone would entail, who would enforce it, or how
Turkey would secure its international backing.55 The claimed purpose of the zone
was to contain the violence in Syria from spilling across the border, but also to
provide a humanitarian corridor, or “ISIL-free zone,” for the hundreds of thousands
displaced from the fighting. As Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told reporters,
“Once ISIL has been cleared from the areas in northern Syria, ‘safe zones’ will be
formed naturally, offering havens for displaced people.”56
It remained unclear what the proposed buffer zone would require in terms
of its scale and scope.  Various proposals held that the “safe zone” was to serve as a
54Background interview with Turkish ex-military official in Istanbul, Oct. 2012.
55 Erin Cunningham, “U.S., Turkey Aim to Create Buffer Zone on Syrian Border. Nobody
Knows How” The Washington Post, Aug. 12, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-said-it-will-create-a-safe-zone-on-
syrian-border-but-nobody-knows-how/2015/08/12/4c7d0baa-37e4-11e5-ab7b-
6416d97c73c2_story.html.
56 Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly, “U.S.-Turkey Deal Aims to Create de Facto ‘safe zone’ in
Northwest Syria,” The Washington Post, July 26, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-us-turkey-plan-amounts-to-a-safe-zone-in-
northwest-syria/2015/07/26/0a533345-ff2e-4b40-858a-c1b36541e156_story.html.
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kind of “no man’s land” that could be extended further into Syria if needed.57 Initial
plans called for roughly 100 kilometers of a narrow strip of land on the Turkish side
of the heavily mined border.58 Presumably, opposition-controlled parts of Idlib and
Aleppo provinces would be included.
This flexibility may have been precisely why a buffer zone was considered an
attractive policy option.  Its unclear scope and consequences made it a tool that could
be “sold” to anti-Kurdish and Islamist hardliners, but also internationalists and
humanitarians across Turkey.  Domestically, the 2015 parliamentary election, in
which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey lost its majority
while a pro-Kurdish party gained more seats,59 was likely a larger factor in Turkey’s
final drive to implement a “safe zone” in northern Syria, as it would ostracize the
Kurdish political wing and rally parts of the anti-Kurdish electorate behind the AKP.
Establishing a buffer zone in northern Syria potentially to be used against Kurdish
militants would also constitute a major political victory for the conservative and
ultranationalist parts of the Turkish leadership.
Perhaps, ironically, a Turkish buffer zone could also calm those international
partners and allies worried about the purpose and costs of stronger forms of military
intervention, and rally international public opinion when combined with
humanitarian rhetoric.  Legally, there was precedent for such zones—a similar one
existed between Baghdad and Ankara during the Iran-Iraq war.60 Russia and China
had rejected all proposals for military intervention, and pledged to veto them in the
UN Security Council, primarily because of their stance on state sovereignty, and due
to what they considered a deplorable precedent in the 2011 Libya intervention. In
Russia’s case, geostrategic concerns over its Syrian ally supplemented this position.
Internationally, this situation called for a tool with enough legal flexibility so
that it might arguably fall outside of the UN Security Council’s purview.  Similarly,
historical precedent makes a buffer zone more likely to be accepted by Turkey’s
international partners.  As various examples suggest, it is a passive and rather limited
foreign policy tool.  In this, the buffer zone exhibits many similarities to the position
the no-fly zone held in international negotiations prior to the 2011 Libyan
intervention.61
57 “Drawing in the Neighbours,” The Economist, July 4, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656692-turkey-and-jordan-are-
considering-setting-up-buffer-zones-war-scorched.
58 “Drawing in the Neighbours.”
59 Ian Traynor and Letsch, “Turkey Election: Ruling Party Loses Majority as pro-Kurdish
HDP Gains Seats,” The Guardian, June 7, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/07/turkey-election-preliminary-results-
erdogan-akp-party.
60Brendan O’Leary, The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
61 Gustav Meibauer, “‘Doing Something’: The No-Fly Zone in UN Security Council
Decision-Making in the 2011 Libya Intervention,” St. Antony’s International Review, May 2015,
pp. 44–74.
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On the side of the Turkish allies, the United States and the European states
feared costs of intervention would, in the end, fall on them, and worried that
additional involvement in Syria would only lay the groundwork for greater military
intervention in the conflict, leading to another Afghanistan/Iraq-like quagmire. At
least in diplomatic negotiations, this called for a lesser form of intervention, ideally
more limited in nature, and with a history that credibly suggested its primary function
was humanitarian.  Again, a buffer zone offered itself.  All the while, however, a
buffer zone would allow the Ankara government to pursue its own distinct agenda:
to create a kind of legal no man’s land where its forces would be able to carry out
airstrikes in pursuit not only of ISIL, but more importantly also of Kurdish rebels, all
the while signaling genuine humanitarian concern and commitment to the outside
world. The logic is that Turkish authorities are seeking to renew their cross-border
counterinsurgency operations against Kurdish separatists both in Iraq and in Syria,
and are using a buffer zone as a cloak of legitimacy and goodwill.  Turkey carried out
cross-border attacks against ISIL targets and arrested a number of Islamic militants
to wage their war.62
The Turkish Buffer Zone as a Tool of Opportunism
Ankara sought to portray the zone as one of humanitarian necessity to
prevent fleeing Syrian refugees from exposure to mines, evoking the precedence of
1991 northern Iraq, Bosnia, or Rwanda. Yet, evidence points to the Turkish
government’s different agenda: the renewal of hostilities against Kurdish separatists.
Considering the three indicators of possible offensives in the contested areas of
northern Syria and Iraq, or opportunist buffer zone usage, namely relative capability
distribution, strategic depth and sovereignty issues, as well as historical precedent, the
Turkish buffer zone proposal fits the bill. First, as an easy indicator of relative
capability distribution as in existing military forces and equipment, the balance
quickly tips in Turkey’s favor.  Syria under the Assad regime, prior to the outbreak of
the civil war, possessed a 300,000-strong army and about 40 MIG fighters, but still
relied on outdated Soviet-era weaponry, such as T54 and T72 tanks.63 Its air-defense
was considerably better than Libya’s, for example, but still could be suppressed at
relatively low-risk. Its troops were poorly trained.
On the other hand, Turkey boasts NATO’s second largest military force (at
one million troops), including a considerable and modern air force, as well as highly
mechanized and armored rapid-response divisions that can mobilize 50,000 troops
62 Traynor and Letsch, “Turkey Election.”
63“Syria’s Steel Beasts: The T-72,” Bellingcat, Dec. 14, 2014,
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/12/14/1813/; Soner Cagaptay and Coskun
Unal, “The Turkey-Syria Military Balance,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (Washington, D.C.:
Washington Institute),  http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-turkey-
syria-military-balance.
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under 72 hours.64 Clearly, it cannot simply enforce a buffer zone unilaterally.  That is
partly because of Turkey’s divisive domestic politics, also due to limits set by
international law and its NATO membership, but finally because Turkish forces are
mostly defensive in nature.65
As an example, a buffer zone would require robust airpower to patrol,
something Turkey is unable to provide without NATO or U.S.-led assistance and
reconnaissance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s significant military superiority over Syria
makes its desire for a buffer zone more likely one of opportunism.
Secondly, we have argued that states that view their neighbors more as areas
of “strategic depth” than as sovereign entities are more likely to overlook concerns
around sovereignty and use buffer zones offensively. Indeed, there is a vast array of
empirical evidence that at least some of Turkey’s leadership see parts of northern
Syria as de facto Turkish hinterland. In this context, Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s
comments about Turkey’s neighborhood are remarkable.66 Interestingly, the concept
of “strategic depth” across formal state borders runs both ways in southern
Turkey—Kurdish militant groups in Turkey use northern Iraq as strategic depth to
sustain their insurgencies.  Their foothold in northern Syria could strengthen this de
facto Kurdish-controlled rump state along the entire Turkish border, and create a
broader security concern around strategic depth in Turkey’s volatile southern
neighborhood.
Finally, closely related to the views of many in the Turkish leadership vis-à-
vis the sovereignty of its southern neighbors, the region indeed experienced multiple
buffer zone-type arrangements that transcended borders.  In 1984, Turkey had signed
a similar joint agreement with Iraq, allowing both states to pursue Kurdish militants
across each other’s borders.  The practice was continued after the 1991 no-fly zone in
northern Iraq, which disabled Iraqi resistance to Turkish incursions against the
autonomous northern Kurdish regions.  In 1999, Turkey inked an agreement with
Syria permitting it to carry out hot pursuit raids into northern Syria, as mentioned.
This agreement was subsequently invoked in 2014, despite its referring to a different
set of circumstances and a different era. Arguably, then, an opportunistic use of a
buffer zone was likely. Additional empirical evidence points to the actual existence of
such motives in the Turkish proposal of a buffer zone.
To begin with, there was considerable semantic confusion over the Turkish
proposal, particularly over what the zone would be called. When President Erdogan
visited the United States in 2014, he referred to it both as a “no-fly zone” and a
64Tom Clonan, “Turkey Well Equipped to Confront Assad Threat,” The Irish Times, Oct. 6,
2012, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/turkey-well-equipped-to-confront-assad-threat-
1.548459.
65Cagaptay and Unal, “The Turkey-Syria Military Balance.”
66Yonca Poyraz Dogan, “‘Davutoğlu’s Book ‘Strategic Depth’ far from Being Deep, '”
Today's Zaman, Feb. 8, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/monday-talk_davutoglus-book-
strategic-depth-far-from-being-deep_372116.html.
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“buffer zone.”67 But his own prime minister corrected him: speaking to Al-Jazeera,
Ahmet Davutoğlu said, “We have never used the word ‘buffer zone.’  What we want
is a ‘safe haven,’ a humanitarian term, guaranteed by military forces.”68 This mirrors
both the above-mentioned definitional distinction often made between strategic and
humanitarian motivations, as well as the Turkish leadership’s confusion as to why
such a zone might be attractive.
Given the buffer zone’s possible functions, and its ambiguity in definition
and application, the Turkish leadership’s lack of clarity should not be surprising.
Alternatively, the confusion might have been intentional to some degree—various
people in the Turkish leadership had different ideas as to what end the buffer zone
would be imposed, because the buffer zone was “sold” differently to Turkish leaders.
All of this would suggest that the buffer zone idea originated with strategic or military
advisors rather than the core leadership.
The results of this confused rhetoric offensive were mixed: the Russians,
who had been arming the Syrian regime, chose to oppose any kind of buffer zone,
apparently feeling that the suggestion came too close to the 2011 Libya “model.”69
The United States remained lukewarm, preoccupied with defeating ISIL and upset
about Turkey’s lack of cooperation on that front, especially its prior refusal of access
to Incirlik airbase (located just 100 miles from the Syrian border). Washington
worried that a buffer zone would escalate the conflict, provide a vacuum for
extremist groups like ISIL to fill, and draw in more outside powers. Jordan, for
example, was quick to entertain the notion of a similar buffer zone stretching from
Suwayda to Deraa in the south.70
The French, meanwhile, backed a buffer zone for humanitarian reasons.71
Also, both the United States and France, though not outright advocates of secession,
traditionally have been supportive of the Kurds, and therefore remained suspicious
of Turkey’s motives for a buffer zone until this past year.72 All the while, human
67Muharrem Sarikaya, “Buffer Zone or Safe Haven?” Today’s Zaman,
http://www.todayszaman.com/turkish-press-review_buffer-zone-or-safe-
haven_361883.html.
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69 Paraszczuk, “Why Syria and Russia Oppose Turkey’s Idea of a ‘Buffer Zone’ Despite IS
Advances,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 15, 2014,
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71 Max Fisher, “Buffer Zones: The New International Plan for a Mini-Invasion of Syria,
Explained,” News Portal, Vox, Oct. 9, 2014,
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rights activists fret that a buffer zone would allow Turkey to either deport or refuse
entry to refugees since in theory, they would now have a safe zone in Syria.73
In interviews, a number of Turkish former military officials and other
military experts admitted the buffer zone’s purpose was never to prevent an escalation
of hostilities but rather to provide legitimacy for Turkey to continue its pursuit of
Kurdish militants into Iraq or Syria (as well as punish Syria for hosting such
militants).74 Leaked Stratfor memos also support the argument that Turkey’s push
for a buffer zone is borne out of fear not of the Syrian civil war spilling over the
border but out of concern that Syrian Kurds, who comprise 30-40 percent of the
population of northeastern Syria, might defeat the Islamist and government forces in
the north and establish a safe haven themselves from which to carry out cross-border
attacks against Turkey.  This would be a mirror image of the Kurdish insurgency in
Iraqi Kurdistan, and again with strong similarities to the 1991 safe haven and no-fly
zone.
Establishing a buffer zone would allow Turkey to intervene in Syria as it
could use the pretext both of self-defense and humanitarian concerns. There are
claims within Turkey, including from scholars and military experts, that “[a]ccording
to UN decisions […] Turkey has the right to conduct cross-border ‘hot pursuit’
operations in Syria if terrorist activity near its borders is detected.”75 PKK terrorists,
who are withdrawing from Turkish lands as part of an ongoing settlement process
the Turkish government launched in 2012 to end its Kurdish problem, were allegedly
joining up with Syrian Kurdish forces in northern Syria.76 The aim of these forces
was to make Turkey's foreign policies in Syria ineffective and to strengthen the
PKK’s hand in the settlement process.77
Consequently, a strong case can be made that while Turkey presented the
buffer zone as one motivated by humanitarianism, it was motivated more by what
domestic hardliners, Turkish nationalists and certain military elements who regarded
as the existential threat from Kurdish separatism. Through this lens, such a zone
would provide Turkish forces greater leeway to carry out cross-border attacks and, in
Ankara’s view at least, prevent Kurdish separatists from carving out their own safe
zone.
Turkey’s leadership, in its apparent enthusiasm for a buffer zone, however,
seemed to have forgotten lessons learned from previous buffer zones. While a buffer
syrian-town-amid-wave-of-us/2014/10/08/e76627fa-4edd-11e4-8c24-
487e92bc997b_story.html.
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zone could possibly prevent direct spillover of fighting into Turkish territory and
allow additional strikes against the Syrian Kurds, it could also prove a slippery slope
into the Syrian civil war.  The only party that likely can be coerced to adhere to the
zone would be the Assad regime, whereas both Kurdish militants and especially ISIL
are unlikely to be deterred. Their de-facto foothold in the region that would be
included in the buffer zone would make the provision of security within its
demarcation extremely difficult, as it could be expected that both militant groups can
blend in with civilian populations.
In addition, ISIL in particular undoubtedly would try to probe the
effectiveness of the zone through raids or terrorist attacks. This would, in turn,
necessitate retaliatory strikes, which would quickly escalate into intervention against
every conflict party in the Syrian civil war. Overt offensive strikes against the Syrian
or Iraqi Kurds, however, would mean that Turkey could quickly lose Western
sympathies. Nevertheless, the recent open air strikes (under no “zone” regime, and
not officially part of the international coalition against ISIL) suggest that the Turkish
leadership may have decided not to care.
Buffer Zones: Unintended Consequences
The efficacy of buffer zones is questionable, and their legality, in terms of
the conditions under which their delineation can be violated, is suspect. That may
explain why Turkey is pushing for such a zone along its borders. Ankara claims its
aims are purely humanitarian—to provide a cordon sanitaire for Syrian refugees
displaced by the war—and defensive: the buffer zone would serve as a security
prophylactic to prevent the Syrian conflict from spilling further into Turkey. Yet, as
we have argued, Turkey’s primary concern is preventing Kurds in the region from
seeking greater autonomy.
Ironically, as an unintended consequence and not unlike the U.S.-led no-fly-
zone imposed over Northern Iraq in 1991 to halt flows of Iraqi Kurdish refugees,
Turkey’s proposed buffer zone in Syria might actually provide Kurdish militants with
greater cover to carry out cross-border attacks in Turkey. The advent of ISIL and the
international coalition fighting it has further decreased the attractiveness of a buffer
zone for Turkey, as its consequences are by now virtually unpredictable because the
Syrian conflict has quickly balkanized over the last months.
Clearly, Turkey’s fears of a Kurdish state on its doorstep are not unfounded.
Syria’s Kurds reportedly had struck deals with both opposition forces and the Syrian
government as a way to both hedge their bets and remain semi-autonomous.
However, Turkey’s policy to date of turning a blind eye to Islamist fighters streaming
across its border, while taking a hawkish stance against Kurdish rebels, is misguided
and bound to backfire. The opposite strategy might actually yield better results:
stronger anti-ISIL efforts combined with a slow “crowding-out” of Kurdish militant
elements from the Turkish borderlands could prove much more effective, but also
difficult to accomplish. As it stands, the buffer zone envisioned by some elements of
the Turkish government would neither alleviate the suffering among displaced
Syrians nor make Turkey any more secure from terrorist violence. It would only free
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up its military to pursue Kurdish rebels across its border with greater force, and make
an already violent and dangerous border region only more violent and dangerous.
